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Restitution of Mistaken Enrichment under Section 73 of 
Malaysia's Contracts Act 1950: Pouring New Wine into an 
Old Bottle? 
 
Alvin W-L See * 
 
This article makes two main suggestions regarding the interpretation of s 73 
of Malaysia's Contracts Act 1950, which sets out the right to recover a 
mistaken enrichment. The first suggestion is that the courts should have 
regard to the historical background against which the section was enacted, 
especially because the pre-enactment common law was a historical curiosity. 
This will dispel certain misconceptions about the nature of the statutory right 
by shedding light on its supposed affinity with contract and its relationship 
with the obsolete forms of action and the principle of unjust enrichment. The 
second suggestion is that the content of s 73 needs to be developed so as to 
enable it to better address complex cases. In undertaking the task of 
formulating the detailed rules and principles for the section, the courts should 
draw on the experience of other major common law jurisdictions. It shall be 
shown that the common law method of analysing issues of unjust enrichment 




The case of a mistaken enrichment is generally accepted as the paradigm example of 
unjust enrichment.1  In Malaysia, the right to restitution of a mistaken enrichment is 
found in s 73 of the Contracts Act 1950 (Msia) (CA 1950), which states: 'A person to 
whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by mistake or under coercion, must 
repay or return it'. While the statutory recognition of such a right is much welcomed, 
there are a number of concerns regarding its interpretation that require serious 
attention. First, the historical background against which the section was enacted is 
often overlooked. This has led to the drawing of a false analogy between the statutory 
claim and a contractual claim, as well as an incorrect distinction between the statutory 
claim and a claim for money had and received. The consequences of such 
misconceptions must not be underestimated, hence warranting a greater emphasis on 
the study of the history of the law of unjust enrichment. Second, the section's wording, 
if left in its simple and general form, could not adequately address complex disputes, 
particularly those that involve competing interests. There is clearly a need to develop 
the section's content and it is argued that the most efficient approach is to draw on the 
experience of other major common law jurisdictions. A substantial portion of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* LLB (Leeds), BCL (Oxon); Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University 
(alvinsee@smu.edu.sg). I am indebted to Tang Hang Wu, Goh Yihan and Yip Man for their helpful 
comments on the earlier drafts of this paper. All errors are my own. 
1 Professor Birks regarded the mistaken payment of a non-existent debt as the core case of unjust 
enrichment. See P Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p 3. 
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article is devoted to demonstrating the usefulness of incorporating the tested common 
law method of analysing issues of unjust enrichment into the framework of s 73. The 
ultimate aim of this article is to promote a principled approach in the application of s 
73. A principled treatment of the law is, after all, the hallmark of a mature legal 
system. 
 
II The Importance of Legal History 
 
The Indian Contract Act 1872 (Ind) (ICA 1872) was enacted 'to define and amend 
certain parts of the law relating to contracts'.2  Despite its modest statement of purpose, 
the ICA 1872's coverage of the general contract law is fairly substantial. Its contents 
were drawn mainly from 19th-century English contract law modified to suit local 
circumstances.3 This novel enactment was first extended to the Federated Malay States 
by the Contract Enactment 1899 (Msia) and later to the Unfederated Malay States by 
the Contracts (Malay States) Ordinance 1950 (Msia) in a revised form. Post-
independence, in 1974, the latter was further revised and extended to the whole of 
Malaysia,4 and was reenacted as the CA 1950.5 Due to its historical roots, English and 
Indian case law, as well as Privy Council decisions that involved appeals from India 
and Malaysia, are highly persuasive in the interpretation of the CA 1950.6 
Much has been said elsewhere about the extent to which English contract law has 
been adopted and departed from,7 as well as the continuing interactions between the 
enactment and the common law.8  What remains lacking,9 however, is the equivalent 
level of comparative study with regard to Pt VI of the CA 1950 (ss 69-73)10 which, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ICA 1872, Preamble. 
3 See H S Cunningham and H H Shephard, The Indian Contract Act, No IX of 1872, Together with an 
Introduction and Explanatory Notes, Table of Contents, Appendix and Index, 3rd ed, Higginbotham, 
Madras, 1878; W Stokes, The Anglo-Indian Codes, Vol I, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1887, pp 491-534; 
F Pollock and D F Mulla, The Indian Contract Act, With A Commentary, Critical and Explanatory, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1905; Rt Hon Sir G C Rankin, Background to Indian Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1946, ch VII; A C Patra, 'Historical Background of the Indian Contract 
Act, 1872' [1962] J Indian L Institute 373. 
4 Contracts (Malay States) (Amendment and Extension) Act 1974 (Msia). 
5 This was carried out under the Revision of Laws Act 1968 (Msia) without going through the normal 
legislative process. 
6 In Malaysia, the right to appeal from the Federal Court to the Privy Council was abolished in 1985, 
after which the highest binding precedent comes from the Federal Court: Constitution (Amendment) 
Act 1983 (Msia). 
7 See works cited in n 3 above. See also V Sinnadurai, Law of Contract, 4th ed, LexisNexis, Petaling 
Jaya, 2011; A B L Phang, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston's Law of Contract, 2nd Singapore and 
Malaysian ed, Butterworths Asia, Singapore, 1998; M F Cheong, Contract Law in Malaysia, Sweet & 
Maxwell Asia, Petaling Jaya, 2010; N Bhadbhade, Pollock & Mulla: The Indian Contract and Specific 
Relief Acts, 14th ed, LexisNexis, New Delhi, 2012; R R Sethu, 'The History, Impact and Influence of 
the Indian Contracts Act 1872' (2011) 28 JCL 31. 
8  See eg MF Cheong, 'The Malaysian Contracts Act 1950: Some Legislative and Judicial 
Developments Towards a Modern Law of Contract' (2009) 25 JCL 244; J W Carter, 'Fundamental 
Breach and Discharge for Breach under the Contracts Act 1950 (Malaysia)' (2011) 28 JCL 85. 
9 But see M F Cheong, Civil Remedies in Malaysia, Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Petaling Jaya, 2007, ch 7; 
D Fung, 'Restitution and Section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950' [1994] 2 MLJ lxxix. 
10 The Indian equivalent is the ICA 1872, Ch V (ss 68-72). The right to recover a mistaken enrichment 
is found in s 72, which is identical to the CA 1950 s 73. 
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under the heading 'Of Certain Relations Resembling Those Created By Contract', sets 
out certain quasi-contractual causes of action recognized by mid-19th century English 
law.11 Today, most of these are best understood as based on the principle of unjust 
enrichment.12 
The codification of these causes of action is a welcome development, especially 
because the common law prior to the enactment of the ICA 1872 was a historical 
curiosity. This was mainly due to the influence of the forms of action, which resulted 
in an overemphasis on form over substance. Unfortunately, the Malaysian courts have 
failed to capitalize on the opportunity to begin afresh, at least not to the full extent. 
Their unfamiliarity with the pre-enactment common law has allowed obsolete and 
incorrect conceptions to seep into legal thought, affecting the development of the 
modern law. In other words, legal development is impeded by the failure to learn from 
past mistakes. 
It is helpful to begin by understanding the influence of the forms of action on the 
early development of the English law of unjust enrichment.13 This would explain why 
it was not unusual in the 19th century for matters of unjust enrichment to be subsumed 
within works on contract.14 The 16th century saw the creation of a new form of action 
known as assumpsit, which entailed an assertion that the defendant broke a promise to 
pay. It was the main form of action used to enforce a claim for breach of a contractual 
promise. By the later half of the 17th century, it was extended to enforce a number of 
non-contractual claims, most notably a claim to recover a mistaken payment.15 To 
justify such use of assumpsit, the obligation to repay was treated as though having 
arisen from a contract. In Moses v Macferlan,16 Lord Mansfield said: 
 
If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice, to refund; 
the law implies a debt, and gives this action, founded in the equity of the 
plaintiff's case, as it were upon a contract ('quasi ex contractu', as the Roman law 
expresses it). 
 
It is important to understand that this statement was in response to the objection that 
'no assumpsit lies, except upon an express or implied contract'.17 Thus, although the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Pollock and Mulla, above, n 3, pp 238-50; Cunningham and Shephard, above, n 3, pp xlii-xlv, 199-
211; Stokes, above, n 3, pp 533-4. 
12 See Law Commission of India, Thirteenth Report (Contract Act, 1872), New Delhi, 1958, pp 11-13. 
13 See J B Ames, 'The History of Assumpsit' (1888) 2 Harvard L Rev 53; R M Jackson, The History of 
Quasi-Contract in English Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1936; J H Baker, 'The Use of 
Assumpsit for Restitutionary Money Claims 1600-1800' in E J H Schrage, ed, Unjust Enrichment: The 
Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1995, p 31; AW-L 
See, 'An Introduction to the Law of Unjust Enrichment' [2013] 5 MLJ i. 
14 See eg S Comyn, A Treatise of the Law Relative to Contracts and Agreements Not Under Seal, Vol 
II, J Butterworth, London, 1807; J Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Contracts Not Under 
Seal, S Sweet, London, 1826; S M Leake, Elements of the Law of Contracts, Stevens and Sons, 
London, 1867. 
15 Lady Cavendish v Middleton (1628) Cro Car 141; 79 ER 725. 
16 (1760) 2 Burr 1005 at 1008; 97 ER 676 at 678. 
17 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005 at 1008; 97 ER 676 at 678. Thus, Professor Birks described 
Lord Mansfield's statement as a 'brilliant and dangerous attempt to kill two birds with one alien stone, 
the appeal to the Roman phrase quasi ex contractu which seeks both to justify the action's form and to 
affirm its non-contractual nature'. 
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courts continued to refer to claims that were founded on quasi or implied contract,18 it 
was generally understood that the reference to contract was not to be taken literally.19 
There was indeed a period when the fictitious contract was regarded as giving rise to 
matters of substance.20 But this was severely criticised and was eventually rejected.21 
The CA 1950 (and the ICA 1872) made no reference to the forms of action and 
related concepts since it postdated their abolition.22 This was likely to be an intentional 
attempt to break away from past procedural complexities.23 Unfortunately, Maitland's 
observation that the forms of action continue to rule us from their graves is as true 
today as it was a century ago.24 Two examples would suffice. 
In AmBank (M) Bhd v KB Leisure (M) Sdn Bhd  (AmBank),25 which concerned a 
claim to recover mistaken payments, the High Court held that s 73 only applies where 
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the mistaken payer and payee. The 
court allegedly found support from the two statutory illustrations to the section, of 
which we shall only refer to the one concerning mistake.26 Illustration (a) states: 'A 
and B jointly owe RM100 to C. A alone pays the amount to C, and B, not knowing 
this fact, pays RM100 over again to C. C is bound to repay the amount to B'. It is 
possible that this illustration was drafted to reflect a liability mistake; that is, an 
erroneous belief that one is liable to pay another. But even the requirement of liability 
mistake is not confined to a mistake as to contractual liability.27 The plaintiff could, 
for example, be mistaken about his or her liability to pay tax or a judgment debt. The 
court's insistence on a contractual link must have stemmed from the misconception 
that s 73 is based on contract principles. It is, after all, found in a contract statute. 
History, however, has informed us that the affinity between contract and unjust 
enrichment was purely a result of historical accidents. Contract and unjust enrichment 
are conceptually distinct. A mistaken payee does not contract to repay the mistaken 
payer. To regard him or her as having done so, when in fact he or she did not, is to 
subscribe to the implied contract theory, which has long fallen out of favour. In Badr-
un-nisa v Muhammad Jan,28 Straight J of the Indian High Court observed that 'the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See eg Jacob v Allen (1703) 1 Salk 27; 91 ER 26; Cock v Vivian (1734) W Kel 203; 25 ER 569. 
19 See eg Leake, above, n 14, pp 39-40; W D Evans, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations, or 
Contracts: By M Pothier, Vol I, Joseph Butterworth, London, 1806, Intro, p 85; H Maine, Ancient Law, 
John Murray, London, 1861, pp 343-4; W R Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contract, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1879, pp 321, 324; F Pollock, Principles of Contract at Law and in Equity, 
Stevens and Sons, London, 1876, p 29. 
20 See eg Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 at 415, where the House of Lords declared that '[t]he 
fiction can only be set up with effect if such a contract would be valid if it really existed'. 
21 See United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1; Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn 
Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC 
[1996] AC 669; Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221; 69 ALR 577. 
22 The forms of action were abolished by the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 (UK). 
23 State of West Bengal v BK Mondal & Sons (1962) AIR SC 779 at 913. 
24 A H Chaytor and W J Whittaker, eds, F W Maitland, Equity, also the Forms of Action at Common 
Law, Cambridge University Press, 1910, p 296. 
25 [2012] 7 MLJ 364 at 375-6. 
26 The obligation to consider the illustrations was emphasised in Mohamed Syedol Ariffin v Yeoh Ooi 
Gark [1916] 2 AC 575 at 581. 
27 See section IV(d) below. 
28 (1880) ILR 2 All 671 at 674. See also Stokes, above, n 3, p 586: 'This gets rid of the English fiction 
of an implied contract and promise to repay'. 
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provisions of the Contract Act, chapter V, have superseded this fiction of implied 
contract and promise'. Similarly, in Koh Siak Poo v Sayang Plantation Bhd  (Koh Siak 
Poo),29 the Malaysian Court of Appeal has explicitly rejected the implied contract 
theory. For these reasons, this aspect of the court's decision in AmBank was clearly 
incorrect. 
The other example is the continued references to the obsolete forms of action 
without understanding what they really mean. In the context of mistaken payments, the 
courts almost never fail to speak of an action for money had and received. It was 
usually perceived as a wider claim that is distinct from the statutory claim 
encapsulated in s 73, although reference to the principle of unjust enrichment was 
often made in relation to both claims.30 In truth, the action for money had and received 
was a sub-sub form of the action of assumpsit and was therefore only a procedural 
means by which a plaintiff in the past enforced his or her claim. It was not a cause of 
action. 31  In Kelly v Solari, 32  which Malaysian courts frequently refer to when 
addressing a case of mistaken payment, the plaintiff brought an action for money had 
and received. But the basis of the plaintiff's claim was the mistake in making the 
payment to the defendant, which rendered the defendant's enrichment unjust. In 
Malaysia, this claim is now embodied in s 73.33 In overlooking these connections, the 
courts often ended up explaining the action for money had and received by resorting to 
broad, open-ended notions such as equity, conscience and natural justice.34 However, 
as to be expected, the courts always arrived at the same conclusion for both claims. 
While this means that no direct harm is caused, the incorrect distinction is unnecessary 
and is liable to confuse. In fact, there is only one case, Bumiputra-Commerce Bank 
Bhd v Siti Fatimah Mohd Zain (Siti Fatimah), where the court correctly identified the 
relationships between s 73, money had and received, and unjust enrichment.35 Clearly, 
the way forward is to abandon references to the obsolete forms of action and instead 
emphasise the precise identification of the ground(s) for restitution.36 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 [2002] 1 MLJ 65 at 70. 
30 See AmBank [2012] 7 MLJ 364; Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd v Hashbudin bin Hashim [1998] 3 MLJ 
262 (Bank Bumiputra); Green Continental Furniture (M) Sdn Bhd lwn Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2011] 8 
MLJ 394 (Green Continental Furniture); Affin Bank Bhd v MMJ Exchange Sdn Bhd [2011] 9 MLJ 787 
(Affin Bank). 
31 See Alwie Handoyo v Tjong Very Sumito [2013] SGCA 44 at [124]: '[A]lthough the Plaintiffs' claim 
... was pleaded as money had and received, that, strictly speaking, is not a cause of action. The action 
of money had and received was a type of "common" count. Common counts were historical pleading 
devices that permitted the pleading of claims in general terms with specific details of the debt sought to 
be recovered left to the law of evidence'. 
32  (1841) 9 M & W 54; 152 ER 24. 
33 For similar interpretation of the ICA 1872 s 72, see Mahabir Kishore v State of Madhya Pradesh 
(1990) AIR SC 313; Renusagar Power Co Ltd v General Electric Co (1994) AIR SC 860. 
34 See section IV(d) below. 
35 [2011] 2 CLJ 545. 
36 Alwie Handoyo v Tjong Very Sumito [2013] SGCA at [125]: 'Plaintiffs should be precise in 
elucidating the basis for their restitutionary claims. Identifying the precise underlying cause of action 
for a restitutionary claim has practical consequences in terms of affecting what the plaintiff needs to 
show in order to establish the claim'. 
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III Developing Section 73 
 
Like most statutory provisions, s 73 is expressed in clear and simple language. While 
this is usually beneficial, it also has the propensity to conceal complexities that may 
arise in cases of mistaken enrichment. For example, the section says nothing about the 
mistaken payee's interest, which is worthy of protection in certain situations.37 To 
maximise the section's utility, it is necessary to expend effort on formulating its 
detailed rules and principles so as to enable it to adequately address complex disputes. 
The generality of the section's wording suggests that the drafters left room for 
developments. They could not have thought that the law on this topic could be 
comprehensively and accurately stated in so few words given the uncertain state of the 
pre-enactment common law. Moreover, s 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 
1967 (Msia) requires the courts to adopt a purposive approach in statutory 
interpretation. The purpose of s 73 is surely to adequately address cases of mistaken 
enrichment, including the proper balancing of competing interests. 
As said earlier, the right to recover a mistaken enrichment is based on the 
principle of unjust enrichment. Before proceeding to examine how s 73 could be 
developed by reference to this principle, it is necessary to make two important points. 
Both concern the need to ensure coherence and consistency in the law. First, it is 
important to understand that Pt VI of the CA 1950 does not purport to codify the entire 
law of unjust enrichment, which is a very ambitious task even for today.38 As the Law 
Commission of India said in its Thirteenth Report: 'To enumerate the various 
principles which create obligations of this type, as has been done in the American 
Restatement of the law, is not the work of a legislator. To compress what is contained 
therein is an impossible task'.39  In fact, outside Pt VI, the law of unjust enrichment 
continues  to develop. The courts have long recognised total failure of consideration as 
a ground for ordering restitution.40 The Woolwich principle,41 which allows restitution 
in the case of ultra vires levy of tax by a public body, was also recently recognised.42 
As these common law developments also influence the general theme of the law of 
unjust enrichment, they must be taken into account in the interpretation of s 73. Thus, 
as argued earlier, the rejection of the implied contract theory in Koh Siak Poo should 
equally apply to s 73, notwithstanding that the case was concerned with a common law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 In the absence of competing interests, the application of the section is fairly straightforward. See 
Bank Bumiputra [1998] 3 MLJ 262; Siti Fatimah [2011] 8 MLJ 394; Green Continental Furniture 
[2011] 8 MLJ 394; Phileo Allied Bank (M) Bhd v Shahrul Bahthiar Tumpang [2008] 9 CLJ 344. 
38 For restatements of this area of the law, see American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, ALI Publishers, St Paul, 2001; A Burrows, A Restatement of the 
English Law of Unjust Enrichment, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012. 
39 See Law Commission of India, above, n 12, p 13. Instead, the report proposed the insertion of a 
catch-all s 72B, which reads: 'In any case not coming within the scope of sections 68 to 72A, where 
there is no contract, but a person is unjustly benefitted at the expense of another person, the former is 
bound to restore the benefit to the latter or to make compensation therefor'. This suggestion was never 
adopted 
40 Berjaya Times Square Sdn Bhd v M Concept Sdn Bhd [2011] 1 MLJ 597; LSSC Development Sdn 
Bhd v Thomas Iruthayam [2007] 2 CLJ 441; Koh Siak Poo [2002] 1 MLJ 65; Wong Lee Sing v Mansor 
[1972] 2 MLJ 154. 
41 Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1993] AC 70. 
42 Pelangi Sdn Bhd v Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2012] 1 MLJ 825. 
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right to restitution on the ground of total failure of consideration. Another example, 
albeit concerning a different statutory provision, is BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v 
Hunt (No 2).43 In that case, Robert Goff J explained that the principle underlying s 
1(2) and (3) of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 (UK) is the 
prevention of unjust enrichment and he went on to interpret the statutory provisions by 
drawing on the common law principles of unjust enrichment.44 
Second, in formulating the detailed rules and principles for s 73, the courts must 
keep an eye on their potential impact on the other branches of the law. As a general 
rule, unjust enrichment shall not be allowed to contradict a considered position 
elsewhere. For example, an unjust enrichment claim shall be denied if it has the effect 
of redistributing a contractual allocation of risk, even if the requirements of the claim 
were satisfied.45 However, it is also recognised that in certain situations unjust 
enrichment could offer an alternative claim to an existing one. Where money is paid 
away as a result of fraud, for example, the payer could sue the fraudster for the tort of 
deceit (fraud) or unjust enrichment on the ground that it was paid under an (induced) 
mistake.46 
As to the main task of developing the content of s 73, it is suggested that the most 
efficient approach is to draw on the experience of other major common law 
jurisdictions. As the common law rules and principles are carefully crafted on a case-
by-case basis and tested against a wide variety of problems, they are likely to be both 
principled and practically workable. This suggestion is likely to find favour with the 
courts given their fairly liberal treatment of s 73, as evidenced by three examples. The 
first two examples concern the interpretation of the section's wording. In Chin Nam 
Bee Development Sdn Bhd v Tai Kim Choo,47 the High Court had to decide whether 
the narrow meaning of 'coercion' set out in s 15 of the CA 1950 should also apply to 
the same word used in s 73.48 Following the decision of the Privy Council in Kanhaya 
Lal v National Bank of India,49 the court held that the meaning of 'coercion' in s 15 is 
confined to the purpose of determining whether there is 'free consent' in the formation 
of a contract, as required under s 14 of the CA 1950.50 For s 73, the ordinary meaning 
of the word 'coercion' shall apply.51 The practical implication of this decision is that it 
would allow s 73 to apply in a wider range of situations, potentially whenever the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 [1979] 1 WLR 783. See also A Burrows, 'The Relationship Between Common Law and Statute in 
the Law of Obligations' (2012) 128 LQR 232 at 242-3. 
44 The Malaysian equivalent is the Civil Law Act 1956 (Msia) s 15(2) and (3). 
45 In Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 161 at 166, Lord Goff warned that 
'serious difficulties arise if the law seeks to expand the law of restitution to redistribute risks for which 
provision has been made under an applicable contract'. See also C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S 
Watterson, eds, Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, 8th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2011, ch 3 (Goff & Jones); J Beatson, 'Restitution and Contract: Non-Cumul?' (2000) 1 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 83. 
46 See section IV(d) below. 
47 [1988] 2 MLJ 117. See also Naested v State of Perak [1925] FMSLR 10. 
48 'Coercion' is defined in the CA 1950 s 15, as 'the committing or threatening to commit any act 
forbidden by the Penal Code or the unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any property to the 
prejudice of any person whatever with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement'. 
49 (1913) ILR Cal 598. 
50 [1988] 2 MLJ 117 at 119-20. 
51 [1988] 2 MLJ 117 at 119-20. 
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plaintiff's intention to enrich the defendant is vitiated by illegitimate pressure. It also 
lends support to the view that s 73 has no affinity with contract. The second example 
concerned the question of whether s 73 allows the recovery of a payment made under a 
mistake of law. In Sri Sri Shiba Prasad Singh v Maharaja Srish Chandra Nandi52 
(Prasad Singh), the Privy Council observed that s 72 of the ICA 1872 makes no 
distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law, and thus declined to follow the 
then prevailing position under English common law which denied recovery for 
mistake of law.53 This approach was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
India54 as well as the Federal Court of Malaysia.55 The third example, which will be 
explored further in s V(e), is the courts' recognition that certain common law defences 
are available to defeat or limit a claim based on s 73 even though these were not 
expressly provided for in the section.  
The remaining parts of this article will set out to show how the common law 
unjust enrichment analysis could be usefully incorporated into the framework of s 73. 
This will provide a principled framework for assessing and developing the section's 
content, thus allowing the courts to better identify the issues and address them with 
coherent solutions. For this purpose, we will refer mainly to English common law 
given their strong influence on Malaysian law. But the laws of other major common 
law jurisdictions would also be referred to where appropriate. 
  
IV Incorporating the Common Law Unjust Enrichment Analysis into 
the Framework of Section 73 
 
(a) General Framework 
 
The general proposition that a person shall not be unjustly enriched at the expense of 
another is not a definitive legal principle by itself in the sense that it does not offer 'a 
sufficient premise for direct application in particular cases'.56 Instead, as Deane J of 
the High Court of Australia explained in Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul:57 
 
[Unjust enrichment] constitutes a unifying legal concept which explains why the 
law recognizes, in a variety of distinct categories of case, an obligation on the part 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 1949) AIR PC 297, affirmed in Sales Tax Officer, Banaras v Kanhaiya Lal Mukundlal Saraf (1959) 
AIR SC 135 (Sales Tax Officer); Tilokchand and Motichand v H B Munshi (1970) AIR SC 898; 
Mafatlal Industries Ltd v Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536. 
53 Bilbie v Lumley (1802) 2 East 469; 102 ER 448. The mistake of law bar under English law was only 
abolished at the end of the century: Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349. In 
Australia, the abolishment occurred earlier in 1992: David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353; 109 ALR 57 (David Securities). 
54 Sales Tax Officer (1959) AIR SC 135; Tilokchand and Motichand v H B Munshi (1970) AIR SC 898; 
Mafatlal Industries Ltd v Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536. 
55 [2012] 3 CLJ 606. See also Bank Bumiputra [1998] 3 MLJ 262; Green Continental Furniture [2011] 
8 MLJ 394. 
56 Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) (2008) 232 CLR 635 at 665; 247 ALR 412 at 434; 
[2008] HCA 27 at [85] (Lumbers v Cook). 
57 (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 256-7; 69 ALR 577 at 604. See also K Mason, J W Carter and G J Tolhurst, 
Mason & Carter's Restitution Law in Australia, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2008, pp 7-
10 (Mason & Carter); Goff & Jones, above, n 45, p 6. 
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of a defendant to make fair and just restitution for a benefit derived at the expense 
of a plaintiff and which assists in the determination, by the ordinary processes of 
legal reasoning, of the question whether the law should, in justice, recognize such 
an obligation in a new or developing category of case. 
 
Guided by this organising concept, the courts and scholars have gradually worked out 
the detailed rules and principles of unjust enrichment. Under the prevailing common 
law approach, a right to restitution arises where: (a) the defendant is enriched; (b) it is 
at the plaintiff's expense; and (c) it is unjust.58 This is, of course, to state the issues at a 
very general level. Each element of the claim requires further examinations as they 
may raise difficult or even unresolved issues. This framework of analysis would 
ensure some degree of certainty, thus preventing the availability of restitution from 
being determined by one's subjective evaluation of what is unjust enrichment.59 
The Malaysian courts often refer to the elements of an unjust enrichment claim 
when dealing with s 73. This is the correct approach for the statutory right which is 
based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Moreover, as shall be shown, the elements 
of an unjust enrichment claim are either inherent in or could be easily read into the 
section's framework. Unfortunately, however, the courts have sometimes taken a 
broad-brush approach in the treatment of these elements. Particularly, there is a 
tendency to approach the elements of the claim restrictively where they think that the 
facts of the case do not justify restitution, and vice versa. This is best demonstrated by 
the case of AmBank.60 There, a fraudster purchased from the plaintiff bank (the bank) 
three cashier's orders made payable to the defendant, a firm of moneychangers (the 
moneychanger). The cashier's orders were paid for using forged cheques. Before the 
fraud was discovered, the fraudster approached the moneychanger to purchase a large 
sum of foreign money and paid using the cashier's orders. Upon receiving payment, 
the moneychanger delivered the foreign money to the fraudster. After the fraud was 
discovered, the bank sought to recover the money from the moneychanger on the 
ground that it was paid under a mistake, relying on s 73. The High Court held that the 
requirements of s 73 were not satisfied, specifically because the moneychanger was 
not enriched, and that there was no mistake. As shall be explained later, this is 
incorrect. However, as the court correctly held that the moneychanger could raise a 
change of position defence, the court's finding in favour of the moneychanger was 
unquestionably right. 61  The point is that, given the court's recognition that the 
moneychanger has the opportunity to raise a defence, it is unnecessary to be overly 
restrictive in approaching the elements of the claim.62  Take, for example, a case 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221. 
59 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 578 per Lord Goff: 'The recovery of money in 
restitution is not, as a general rule, a matter of discretion for the court. A claim to recover money at 
common law is made as a matter of right'. This was cited with approval in Fernrite Sdn Bhd v 
Perbadanan Nasional Bhd [2011] 6 CLJ 1 at 12-13. See also Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 
162 CLR 221 at 256; David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 
353 at 379; Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 at 185. 
60 [2012] 7 MLJ 364. 
61 Whether such importation of restitutionary defences is justified will be examined in section IV(e). 
62 See Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 581 per Lord Goff: '[T]he recognition of 
change of position as a defence should be doubly beneficial. It will enable a more generous approach to 
be taken to the recognition of the right to restitution, in the knowledge that the defence is, in 
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identical in all aspects to AmBank except that the defendant has not changed his 
position. A restrictive approach towards the elements of the claim would result in the 
deserving plaintiff's claim being defeated, which would be absurd. Instead, the 
balancing of competing interests should be left mainly to the defences. The question of 
whether the defendant is ultimately required to make restitution should therefore be 
analysed in two stages.63 Upon satisfying elements (a) to (c), the plaintiff obtains a 
prima facie right to restitution.64 The burden then shifts to the defendant to raise a 
defence to defeat or limit the plaintiff's prima facie right. If the defendant fails to do 
so, the prima facie right crystallises into an absolute one. This two-stage analysis was 
adopted in Siti Fatimah, where the High Court found that there was a mistaken 
payment but went on to consider whether the defence of change of position applies.65 
A final point before proceeding further is that the word 'restitution' does not 
appear anywhere in the CA 1950. This may be because the term had yet to gain 
currency in legal usage in the mid-19th century.66 However, when used in reference 
(either expressly or implicitly) to a benefit, the terms 'restore', 'return', 'repay' and 
'compensate' shall be regarded as the equivalent of 'restitution'. The phrase 'repay or 
return' in s 73 also indicates that the court could either award restitution of the value of 
the enrichment (personal restitution) or restitution of the enrichment itself (proprietary 
restitution). But the issue of proprietary restitution, which is widely regarded as the 
most difficult area in the law of unjust enrichment, has yet to be considered by the 
Malaysian courts. 67  Due to its complexities, its examination is best undertaken 
elsewhere. 
 
(b) Is the Defendant Enriched? 
 
Section 73 refers to two types of enrichment: 'money' and 'things'. Most, if not all, 
cases in which s 73 was applied or considered concerned mistaken payments. The term 
'money' usually refers to corporeal money, that is, coins or banknotes, but is also wide 
enough to include incorporeal or bank money. In an age of electronic banking, most 
cases concern the latter. Where the plaintiff pays money into the defendant's bank 
account, the defendant acquires a contractual right to demand payment of that amount 
from his or her bank.68 The defendant's enrichment is the value of that contractual 
right. The term 'things' is more difficult. Its natural meaning is wide enough to include 
objects that could be measured by money and those where monetary measurement is 
impossible or unthinkable. But the law of unjust enrichment is concerned only with the 
former.69 In Peter v Beblow,70 McLachlin J of the Canadian Supreme Court said that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
appropriate cases, available'. 
63 See Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms Sons & Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] QB 677 at 695. 
64 The reference to a prima facie obligation or liability to make restitution could be found in Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1988) 164 CLR 662; 78 ALR 157. 
65 [2011] 2 CLJ 545. 
66 The term 'restitution' was first referred to extensively in Abbot's review of Keener's treatise: E V 
Abbot, 'Keener on Quasi-Contracts. II.' (1897) Harv L Rev 479. 
67 In The Royal Bank of Scotland Bhd v Seng Huah Hua [2013] 9 MLJ 681 (Royal Bank of Scotland), 
the plaintiff's claim for a constructive trust over the mistaken payment was not allowed by the court. 
68 D Fox, Property Rights in Money, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, ch 5. 
69 Birks, above, n 1, pp 50-2; Goff & Jones, above, n 45, p 82. 
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for the element of enrichment the law adopts a 'straightforward economic approach'. 
Indeed, it is doubtful whether the law of unjust enrichment has any role to play in a 
situation where a person seeks restitution of blood or an organ donated by mistake. 
The word 'things' is also problematic for another reason. It tends to imply tangible 
objects. The modern law, however, has since recognised many other types of 
enrichment, whether tangible or intangible, so long as they have monetary value.71 
Examples include services, discharge of debt, use value, etc.72 Unless the courts are 
prepared to stretch the term 'things' beyond its natural meaning, the limitation could 
only be addressed by legislative reform. 
Having examined what may constitute enrichment, a more important question is 
whether the defendant has been enriched and, if so, to what extent.73 In AmBank, the 
court held that the moneychanger was not enriched because it did not retain the benefit 
of the payments.74 This is incorrect for the focus is on receipt, not retention. The 
defendant is enriched upon receiving the enrichment.75 Indeed, s 73 requires only that 
the defendant be a person 'to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered'. 
Whether a defendant who no longer retains the enrichment should be relieved from 
making restitution is a matter to be determined at the defence stage. On the question of 
valuation, it is necessary to draw a distinction between money and benefits in kind (or 
'things', using the language of s 73). As money is the universally accepted measure of 
value, the receipt of money is incontrovertibly enriching.76 A defendant who has 
received a ten-dollar note cannot realistically argue that he or she is not enriched or is 
enriched to a lesser sum. Benefits in kind are different in this respect. A particular 
thing is objectively enriching if it has a market value. But the defendant may not be a 
person who is willing to pay for the thing, or who would not have paid as much for it. 
Thus, in respecting the defendant's freedom of choice and individuality of value, the 
law allows him or her to subjectively devalue the benefit.77 This is, of course, subject 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 [1993] 1 SCR 980 at 990. 
71 As Professor Birks expresses, '[e]nrichment received is the generalisation of money received'. See 
Birks, above, n 1, p 50. 
72 See Goff & Jones, above, n 45, ch 5. See also Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] 3 WLR 351; [2013] UKSC 
50, where the UK Supreme Court laid down the principles for valuing enrichment in the form of 
services. 
73 Sempra Metals Ltd v IRC [2008] 1 AC 56; [2007] UKHL 34 at [119] per Lord Nicholls: 'What is 
ultimately important in restitution is whether, and to what extent, the particular defendant has been 
benefitted'. 
74 [2012] 7 MLJ 364 at 376. See also Kum Wah Sdn Bhd v RHB Bank Bhd [2009] 9 MLJ 490 at 500 
(RHB Bank). 
75 Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] 3 WLR 351; [2013] UKSC 50 at [14] ('[I]t is clear that the enrichment is 
to be valued at the time when it was received'); Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 
AC 349 at 386 ('It is well established that the cause of action for the recovery of money paid under a 
mistake of fact accrues at the time of payment'); David Securities (1992) 175 CLR 353 at 385; 109 
ALR 57 at 80-1 ('From the point of view of the person making the payment, what happens after he or 
she has mistakenly paid over the money is irrelevant, for it is at that moment that the defendant is 
unjustly enriched'). 
76 BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 783 at 799 per Goff J: 'Money has the 
peculiar character of a universal medium of exchange. By its receipt, the recipient is inevitably 
benefited; and ... the loss suffered by the plaintiff is generally equal to the defendant's gain, so that no 
difficulty arises concerning the amount to be repaid'. 
77 P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, ch V. 
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to certain bars. For example, if the defendant refuses to return something that is readily 
returnable, he or she is not entitled to argue that it is of no value to him or her.78 
 
(c) Is It at the Plaintiff's Expense? 
 
Section 73 makes no explicit reference to the requirement of 'at the expense of'. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the requirement has received little attention from the courts. 
However, it is important to regard this requirement as inherent in the section for it 
establishes the necessary link between the plaintiff and the defendant, more 
specifically between the plaintiff's loss and the defendant's enrichment.79 In a two-
party case where the plaintiff mistakenly pays money to the defendant, the latter is 
clearly enriched at the former's expense. There is a transfer of value from the plaintiff 
to the defendant.80 
The position is less clear in a multiple-party case; for example, where P 
mistakenly pays X, and X then pays an equivalent sum to D. The question of whether 
P may leapfrog X to recover from D becomes especially important where X is no 
longer to be found, is insolvent, or is protected by a defence. The traditional view is 
that P cannot recover from D, the explanation being that there is no direct transfer of 
value between them.81 D's enrichment is provided directly by X, and only indirectly by 
P. This prohibition against leapfrogging is sometimes explained as part of the element 
of 'at the expense of'. In other words, a defendant is only enriched at the expense of the 
direct provider of the enrichment.82 
However, this view has been increasingly questioned. It is possible to regard D as 
having been enriched at the expenses of both P and X, so long as we keep an eye on 
the issue of double recovery.83 The preferable view is that the 'at the expense of' 
requirement could be satisfied on a mere but-for causal test; that is, D would not have 
been enriched but for P's mistaken payment to X, while recognising that there may be 
policy reasons to deny P's claim nonetheless.84 In other words, where leapfrogging is 
denied, it is better regarded as based on specific policy concerns as opposed to the 
non-fulfilment of the requirement of 'at the expense of'. For now, it remains beneficial 
to discuss the issue of leapfrogging under the present heading. 
The issue of leapfrogging arose on the facts of AmBank but was overlooked by 
the court. There, although the moneychanger received the money from the bank, the 
value of its enrichment came directly from the fraudster and only indirectly from the 
bank. This is because the bank paid the moneychanger only pursuant to its contractual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See eg Cressman v Coys of Kensington (Sales) Ltd [2004] 1 WLR 2774; [2004] EWCA Civ 47, 
where the defendant was held to have been enriched by choosing to retain the cherished car registration 
number 'TAC 1', which was mistakenly transferred to him when he bought the plaintiff's car. 
79 See Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp 68-9. 
80 Burrows, above, n 79, p 66. 
81 See Burrows, above, n 79, pp 69-85; G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution, 2nd ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, 
pp 105-6. 
82 J Edelman and E Bant, Unjust Enrichment in Australia, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2006, 
pp 138-41. 
83  See C Mitchell, 'Liability Chains' in S Degeling and Edelman, eds, Unjust Enrichment in 
Commercial Law, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2008, pp 131, 135-8. 
84 Goff & Jones, above, n 45, pp 142-62; Birks, above, n 1, pp 89, 93-8. 
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obligations owed to the fraudster, who was the purchaser of the cashier's orders.85 The 
question is whether the bank may leapfrog the fraudster to claim from the 
moneychanger, or more precisely, whether there is any good reason to forbid 
leapfrogging. There are a number of cases directly on point. In Lumbers v Cook, the 
Lumbers entered into a contract with Sons to build them a house.86 Without the 
Lumbers' knowledge the work was subcontracted to Builders. Builders completed the 
work but were not paid in full. Builders then sought to recover the balance from the 
Lumbers by an unjust enrichment claim. The High Court of Australia rejected the 
Lumbers' claim, mainly because to allow it would interfere with the contractual 
allocation of risk that the parties had assumed. In the words of Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ, it would 'constitute a radical alteration of the bargains the 
parties struck and of the rights and obligations which each party thus assumed'.87 
Lumbers v Cook was followed by the English Court of Appeal in MacDonald, 
Dickens & Macklin v Costello.88  There, the defendants, who owned some land, 
engaged the plaintiff builders to construct a number of houses on it. The contract was 
entered into between the plaintiff and a company wholly owned and run by the 
defendants. Dispute later arose when the defendants complained about the quality of 
the work and refused to pay. The plaintiff sued both the company and the defendants. 
The focus was on the claim against the latter, which was based on unjust enrichment. 
Etherton LJ recognised that the defendant's enrichment came only indirectly from the 
plaintiff but did not reject the claim on this basis. Instead, the claim was rejected based 
on a number of overlapping policy concerns, particularly to prevent the plaintiff from 
escaping the risks that they assumed by contracting with the company.89 Both cases 
were recently followed by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Alwie Handoyo v Tjong 
Very Sumito.90  For the same reasons, leapfrogging should be denied in the case of 
AmBank. 
However, matters would be entirely different if the contracts between the bank 
and the fraudster were void,91 rescinded92 or terminated93 before the money was paid 
to the moneychanger.94 In such case, the payments to the moneychanger would not be 
pursuant to contractual obligations owed to the fraudster. Since there is now direct 
transfers of value between the bank and the moneychanger, there will be no issue of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 See Birks, above, n 1, pp 87-8. 
86 (2008) 232 CLR 635; 247 ALR 412; [2008] HCA 27. 
87 (2008) 232 CLR 635 at 674; 247 ALR 412 at 442; [2008] HCA 27 at [126]. 
88 [2011] 3 WLR 1341; [2011] EWCA Civ 930, noted M Yip [2011] OUCLJ 217; AW-L See [2012] 
RLR 125. 
89 See also Goff & Jones, above, n 45, pp 69-73. 
90 [2013] SGCA 44 at [103]-[109]. 
91 For example, for common mistake of fact that is essential to the agreement: CA 1950 s 21. 
92 For example, for fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence: CA 1950 ss 15-20. 
93 The statutory right to terminate a contract is set out in the CA ss 40, 54 and 56(1). The wider 
common law right to terminate a contract is likely to be preserved by the CA 1950 s 1(2). See Carter, 
above, n 8. 
94 Termination of the contract after the money has been paid away will not suffice. Since the effect of 
termination is only to discharge the parties from their future obligations, obligations that arose before 
termination remains valid. See Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367; Photo Production Ltd v Securicor 
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leapfrogging to begin with. The case would revert to a two-party situation. 
In AmBank, the contracts between the bank and the fraudster were voidable for 
fraud.95 However, although both the CA 1950 and the Specific Relief Act 1950 (Msia) 
are silent, it is accepted by case law that the right to rescission is subject to the usual 
equitable bars.96 Of relevance here is the third party rights bar to rescission. The core 
case is where P sells goods to X induced by X's fraud, and before the fraud is 
discovered X resells the goods to D. The traditional assumption is that if D purchased 
the goods in good faith and for valuable consideration, and P sought to exercise his or 
her right to rescind his or her contract with X only after the resale to D, rescission will 
be denied.97 In AmBank, the moneychanger purchased the money from the fraudster 
for valuable consideration and had no notice of the fraud. Since the bank did not seek 
to rescind the contract before the moneychanger's bona fide purchase, the right to 
rescission would appear to be lost.98 
The third party rights bar, however, has been increasingly doubted. While it finds 
support in a few well-known obiter dicta,99 it has never actually been applied.100 It is 
even doubtful whether the bar is necessary to achieve its purported function of 
protecting D's security of receipt. That D's bona fide purchase for value gives him or 
her a clear title in the property purchased, free from any adverse title-based claim by P, 
is undisputed. Whether rescission of the contract between P and X would necessarily 
affect this position to D's prejudice is open to question. In the sale of goods context, 
title in goods may pass upon the completion of the contract of sale without the need 
for delivery.101 Since the contract is the mode of conveyance, rescission of the contract 
would have the effect of pulling back the title in the goods from D to be revested in 
P.102 In balancing the interests of P and D, the law decides that where D has purchased 
the goods for value and in good faith before P's attempt to rescind the contract, P will 
be disallowed from rescinding the contract, which has the effect of pulling back title in 
the goods.103 Beyond the sale of goods context, however, a contract does not by itself 
pass title. If P agrees to lend D money thereby creating a contractual debt, title in the 	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money does not pass to D until delivery. That the contract and the transfer are 
analytically distinct is further demonstrated by the fact that the contract procuring the 
transfer need not be between P and D. In AmBank, for example, the bank's payments to 
the moneychanger were pursuant to contracts between the bank and the fraudster, to 
which the moneychanger was not a party. Since the contract did not pass title, 
rescinding the contract should not have the effect of revesting title in P. 
Rescission is therefore better understood as entailing the exercise of two 
analytically distinct rights: the right to unwind the contract, and the right to revest 
title.104 Since the two rights are not tied to each other, there should be no objection to 
the exercise of one without the other. Faced with D's bona fide purchase for value, the 
right to revest title is unquestionably lost. But this should not affect P's right to unwind 
the contract with X. While allowing the plaintiff to unwind the contract may have an 
indirect effect of allowing P to circumvent the problem of leapfrogging, any protection 
that should be afforded to D against P's claim is best addressed at the defence stage.105 
Importantly, disallowing P from rescinding his or her contract with X may prevent P 
from bringing certain claims against X (provided of course that X is found).106 For 
example, allowing the contract to stand would prevent P from bringing an unjust 
enrichment claim against X since the contract acts as a 'justifying factor' for the 
transfer.107 While in some cases P may be able to terminate the contract for breach, 
thus allowing him or her to bring an unjust enrichment claim against X,108 there may 
be other cases where termination is not possible; for example, where X's 
representation was not incorporated as a term of the contract. For these reasons, the 
third party rights bar to rescission is best abandoned. 
The fact that multiple parties are involved, however, does not necessarily mean 
that an issue of leapfrogging would arise. For example, in a number of mistaken 
payment cases, the fraudster caused the plaintiff bank to transfer money to the 
defendant moneychanger by forging signature on the payment or remittance form.109 
Since the payment by the plaintiff to the defendant is direct, in the sense that it is not 
pursuant to any contractual obligation owed to the fraudster, the defendant is clearly 
enriched at the bank's expense. This is essentially a two-party situation as explained at 
the outset. 
 
(d) Is It Unjust? 
 
As noted earlier, Malaysian courts often approach the 'unjust' inquiry by resorting to 
broad, open-ended notions of equity, conscience and natural justice. A good example 
is Bank Bumiputra, where the court so explained the basis of the duty to repay a 	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VII. 
107 See Goff & Jones, above, n 45, ch 3. 
108 In AmBank [2012] 7 MLJ 364, the plaintiff could terminate the contract with the fraudster for non-
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mistaken payment:110 
 
[I]t is not right for the [defendant] to keep the money. He is bound by the ties of 
natural justice and equity to refund the money to the [plaintiff] ... He would be 
unjustly enriched at the [plaintiff's] expense if the [plaintiff] could not recover 
from him. 
 
Such vague notions simply do not provide sufficiently certain criteria for determining 
when restitutionary relief should be available. A century ago, in Baylis v Bishop of 
London,111 Hamilton J said: 
 
To ask what course would be ex aequo et bono to both sides never was a very 
precise guide ... Whatever may have been the case 146 years ago, we are not now 
free in the twentieth century to administer that vague jurisprudence which is 
sometimes attractively styled 'justice as between man and man'. 
 
Under the prevailing common law approach, which could be traced as far back as to 
the time of Lord Mansfield,112 the 'unjust' inquiry is determined by reference to an 
established list of factors that the law recognises as calling for restitution.113 These are 
commonly known as 'unjust factors'. Section 73 has clearly spelt out two unjust 
factors: mistake and coercion. Both belong to the category of intent-based unjust 
factors, which has a primary focus on the defects in the plaintiff's decision-making 
process. In the case of mistake, the plaintiff argues that he or she has acted on the 
wrong data and therefore there was no real intention on his or her part to benefit the 
defendant.114 The law's response of allowing restitution could be explained by its 
'liberal commitment to individual free choice' in the control of one's resources.115 
The term 'mistake' is not defined in s 73 and is therefore open to interpretation. 
The editors of Goff & Jones define 'mistake' as 'an incorrect belief or assumption about 
a past or present state of affairs'.116 It follows that mere ignorance, which does not 
involve any conscious belief or tacit assumption, is not mistake.117 The definition also 
excludes mere misprediction, which entails a speculation about a future event which 
does not turn out as expected.118 The future event cannot be presently ascertained to be 	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correct or incorrect, and the plaintiff's conscious risk-taking in relation to this 
uncertainty also shows that his or her decision-making process is not impaired. 
As to what is actually required to trigger restitution, the courts should refrain from 
adopting an overly restrictive approach. As said earlier, the balancing of competing 
interests is best left to the defences. The Privy Council in Prasad Singh was therefore 
correct in rejecting the illogical distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law 
for the purpose of s 72 of the ICA 1872, which would have limited the right to 
restitution.119 However, the court went on to say:120 
 
Payment 'by mistake' in s. 72 must refer to a payment which was not legally due 
and which could not have been enforced: the 'mistake' is thinking that the money 
paid was due when in fact it was not due. 
 
The court was referring to the requirement of liability mistake; that is, an erroneous 
belief on the part of the plaintiff that he or she is liable to pay the defendant.121 This 
statement was cited and emphasised in Bank Bumiputra, although the facts of the case 
did not really turn on this; there was a liability mistake.122 The requirement of liability 
mistake has been abandoned in most major jurisdictions. In Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ 
Simms, Son and Cooke (Southern) Ltd,123 Robert Goff J undertook a comprehensive 
examination of the relevant authorities and came to the conclusion that the 
requirement of liability mistake was inconsistent with a number of decisions of the 
House of Lords124 and another Privy Council decision.125 Instead, the cases support the 
view that a simple causative mistake is sufficient. The plaintiff only needs to show that 
he or she would not have enriched the defendant but for the mistake (but-for test).126 
This approach was later adopted by the House of Lords,127 the High Court of 
Australia128 as well as the Privy Council.129 It is also consistent with the approach 
adopted in the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment.130 The Malaysian courts should follow suit as there is really no reason to 
restrict the availability of restitution to situations involving liability mistake. 
A more restrictive approach to the requirement of mistake is, however, justified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 (1949) AIR PC 297. 
120 (1949) AIR PC 297 at 302. 
121 In Aiken v Short (1856) 1 H & N 210 at 215; 156 ER 1180 at 1182, Brambell B said: 'In order to 
entitle a person to recover back money paid under a mistake of fact, the mistake must be as to a fact 
which, if true, would make the person paying liable to pay the money; not where, if true, it would 
merely make it desirable that he should pay the money'. 
122 [1998] 3 MLJ 262 at 268. 
123 [1980] QB 677 at 689-94. 
124 Kleinwort, Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co (1907) 97 LT 263; Kerrison v Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co 
(1911) 81 LJKB 465; RE Jones Ltd v Waring and Gillow Ltd [1926] AC 671. 
125 The Colonial Bank v The Exchange Bank of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia (1885) 11 App Cas 84. 
126 Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms Son and Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] QB 677 at 695. See also 
Larner v London County Council [1949] 2 KB 683; Nurdin & Peacock plc v DB Ramsden & Co Ltd 
[1999] 1 All ER 941 at 962-4. 
127 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349. 
128 David Securities (1992) 175 CLR 353 at 376-8; 109 ALR 57 at 73-5; Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1988) 164 CLR 662 at 671-2; 78 ALR 157 at 160-1. 
129 Dextra Bank [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193 at 202. 
130 ALI, Restatement (Third), above, n 38, §5(2)(a). 
For published version, see Alvin W-L See, “Section 73 of Malaysia's Contracts Act 1950: Pouring New 
Wine into an Old Bottle?” (2014) 31 Journal of Contract Law 206 	  
where there are special interests that the law regards as worthy of protection and the 
required protection could not be sufficiently provided by the defences. A good 
example is a payment made pursuant to a contract mistakenly entered into. Section 21 
of the CA 1950 provides that a contract is void if it is entered into as a result of a 
common mistake of fact that is essential to the agreement. Sections 22 and 23, 
however, state that neither a mistake of law nor a unilateral mistake of fact renders a 
contract void. Since a valid contract acts as a justifying ground for any transfer of 
enrichment, it is only in the first situation, where the contract is void, that restitution is 
allowed.131 It was once argued that the same restrictions should apply to s 73 and 
therefore money paid under a mistake of law should not be recoverable. In Prasad 
Singh, the Privy Council rejected this argument, finding no inconsistency in allowing a 
contract to remain valid although entered into under a mistake of law while allowing 
recovery of a non-contractual payment made under a mistake of law.132 Although the 
court did not elaborate further, there is a ready explanation as to why recovery of a 
mistaken payment made pursuant to a contract should be subjected to stricter 
treatment. Such a case involves special concerns, specifically the need to uphold the 
sanctity of contract and to protect the security of bargain.133 Another possible example 
is the case of mistaken gifts.134 As Professor Tang argues, gifts engender social bonds 
such as love and trust so as to give rise to a moral economy, which is as important to 
protect.135 
Before proceeding further, it is also useful to explain why s 73 of the CA 1950 
applies in a case of fraud when its wording refers only to mistake. Inherent in a claim 
for misrepresentation (including fraud) is an allegation of induced mistake. Whether 
one is dealing with a case concerning induced mistake or a case concerning 
spontaneous mistake, the focus is similarly on the defect in the plaintiff's decision-
making process, which is what renders the enrichment unjust.136 There is, however, a 
possible advantage if the plaintiff could prove that his or her mistake was induced by 
the defendant. It may be that causation could be established by merely showing that 
the mistake had an influence on the plaintiff's decision to enrich the defendant, 
regardless of whether he or she would have acted otherwise but for the 
misrepresentation (contributory cause test).137 The main justification for this liberal 
approach is that there is no need to be concerned about the defendant's security of 
receipt given his or her blameworthiness in inducing the mistake.138 	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However, as the cases demonstrate, the contributory cause test is mostly ignored 
since the but-for test is almost always sufficient to establish liability. Having laid 
down the basic principles relating to mistake, we now turn to the Malaysian case law. 
There are two instances where the courts have applied the simple causal test to find an 
operative mistake. In Siti Fatimah, the High Court held that the causal test was 
satisfied since 'no such moneys would have been made available or paid over if the 
plaintiff bank had known about the mistake or the fraud'.139 Similarly, in Affin Bank, 
the High Court held that there was mistake as it was 'clear that had the true facts been 
known, such payment would not have been made'.140 Two other cases are worthy of 
mention, mainly for the purpose of showing what went wrong. In AmBank, the court 
distinguished between the bank's acts of issuing the cashier's orders and its subsequent 
acts of paying the moneychanger by honouring the cashier's orders. It held that the 
bank's mistake was only in relation to the former acts and that there was no mistake in 
making the payments.141 This decision could be criticised on two grounds. First, the 
court failed to identify a policy reason for insisting on such subtle distinction, 
especially when it is not at all apparent from the wording of s 73. Second, as a matter 
of fact, the bank issued and honoured the cashier's orders for the same reason; that is, 
it was under the mistaken belief that the cashier's orders were properly paid for. The 
causal requirement was satisfied since the bank would not have paid the 
moneychanger but for its mistake. In RHB Bank, the fraudster applied for cashier's 
orders from the plaintiff bank by forging the signatures on the application forms. The 
cashier's orders were paid to an unknowing moneychanger as the purchase price of a 
sum of foreign money. The court held that there was no mistake because the 
moneychanger received the payment in good faith and had given valuable 
consideration by paying the foreign money to the fraudster.142 This is incorrect, for the 
allegation of mistake focuses solely on the plaintiff's impaired intention to benefit the 
defendant. The causal requirement was clearly satisfied since the bank would not have 
paid the moneychanger if it had known about the forgery. The moneychanger's bona 
fide purchase for value is relevant only at the defence stage. 
Finally, something shall be said about s 66 of the CA 1950, which sets out the 
restitutionary consequence following the rescission of a contract: 'any person who has 
received any advantage under the ... contract is bound to restore it, or to make 
compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it'. Where a contract is 
rescinded for misrepresentation (including fraud), the right to restitution could be 
explained as based on unjust enrichment, independent of any alternative cause of 
action in tort.143 As explained earlier, the unjust factor is induced mistake. Where the 
plaintiff bases his or her claim on unjust enrichment, the right to restitution under s 66 
is essentially the same as the right to restitution under s 73. However, in Badiaddin bin 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 [2011] 2 CLJ 545 at 557. 
140 [2011] 9 MLJ 787 at 811. 
141 [2012] 7 MLJ 364 at 375. 
142 [2009] 9 MLJ 490 at 500. 
143 See Segar Oil Palm Estate Sdn Bhd v Tay Tho Bok [1997] 3 MLJ 211, where the Court of Appeal 
held that a deposit paid pursuant to a contract induced by fraud was recoverable on the basis of unjust 
enrichment. See also Siti Fatimah [2011] 2 CLJ 545 at 555-6: 'money paid under a mistake induced by 
fraud can also be recovered as money had and received apart from recovery based on a defendant's 
tortious act under a separate tort of deceit'. [2011] 2 CLJ 545 at 555-6. 
For published version, see Alvin W-L See, “Section 73 of Malaysia's Contracts Act 1950: Pouring New 
Wine into an Old Bottle?” (2014) 31 Journal of Contract Law 206 	  
Mohd Mahidin v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd, the Federal Court held that s 66 
applies only where the plaintiff and the defendant were both parties to the rescinded 
contract.144 This means that s 66 will not apply in a case like AmBank, where the 
moneychanger was only a third party to the contracts between the bank and the 
fraudster. One explanation given by the court is that the doctrine of privity applies.145 
This is clearly incorrect, for a contractual concept should have no relevance where s 66 
is triggered by a cause of action not based on contract. This is also contrary to Indian 
law, which imposes no such restriction for its equivalent of s 66.146 However, the 
practical implication of this decision is insignificant, for the plaintiff could 




(i) Recognition of restitutionary defences 
 
In Moses v Macferlan, Lord Mansfield said that the defendant who is faced with an 
action for money had and received 'may defend himself by every thing which shews 
that the plaintiff, ex aequo & bono, is not intitled to the whole of his demand, or to any 
part of it'.147 In fact, many of the existing restitutionary defences have a long history 
although they may not have been known by their modern names until much later. An 
early statement of the change of position defence could be found in Brisbane v 
Dacres.148 There the captain of the vessel HMS Arethusa was ordered by his admiral 
to carry on board bullions that belonged to private individuals and to deliver them 
from Jamaica to England. The captain received remuneration for the delivery and paid 
part of it to the admiral. It turned out that he was not legally obliged to pay the 
admiral. He sought to recover the money on the ground that it was paid under a 
mistake. The majority disallowed his claim for a number of reasons, but of particular 
relevance is Sir James Mansfield CJ's judgment:149 
 
... I think it would be most contrary to aequum et bonum, if he were obliged to 
repay it back. For see how it is! If the sum be large, it probably alters the habits of 
his life, he increases his expences, he has spent it over and over again; perhaps he 
cannot repay it at all, or not without great distress: is he then, five years and 
eleven months after, to be called on to repay it! 
 
There were also early traces of the bona fide purchase defence. A good example is 	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Price v Neal.150 There the defendant was an endorsee for value of a bill of exchange 
drawn on the plaintiff. It transpired that the bill was forged. As the rogue responsible 
for the fraud had been hanged, the plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant on 
the ground that it was paid under a mistake. The claim was rejected. As Lord 
Mansfield explained:151 
 
[I]t can never be thought unconscientious in the defendant, to retain this money, 
when he has once received it upon a bill of exchange indorsed to him for a fair 
and valuable consideration, which he had bona fide paid, without the least privity 
or suspicion of any forgery. 
 
Since the recognition of restitutionary defences predated the ICA 1872, it is rather 
curious that none was included in Ch V. Neither were they added into Pt VI of the CA 
1950 when the enactment was revised and reenacted. If we recall, the statutory duty to 
restore a mistaken enrichment is stated in absolute terms: 'must repay or return it'. This 
is problematic as there are bound to be cases where to insist on restitution would result 
in unfairness to the defendant. Suppose that the defendant received a mistaken 
payment from the plaintiff and then paid it away to a charity in good faith.152 To 
require the defendant to repay would leave him or her financially worse off, which is 
intuitively unfair. As between the two innocent parties, a fair balance must be struck 
between the plaintiff's interest in recovery and the defendant's interest in not being 
made worse off. 
Fortunately, the Indian courts have recognised a number of exceptions to the 
statutory right to recover a mistaken enrichment under s 72 of the ICA 1872. In 
Prasad Singh, the Privy Council qualified the right to restitution by saying: '[Not] 
every sum paid under mistake is recoverable no matter what the circumstances may 
be. There may in a particular case be circumstances which disentitle a plaintiff by 
estoppel or otherwise'. 153  In Nagorao Govindrao v The Governor-General in 
Council,154 the High Court of Nagpur relied on this statement to extend the list of 
exceptions. There a rogue approached the manager of a temple and said that he wanted 
to fulfil a vow to feed 1000 Brahmins. He then purchased three money orders from a 
post office, altered the monetary figures to appear larger, and caused them to be sent to 
the temple. He appeared again at the temple and collected the money orders from the 
manager on the excuse that they would go together to the market to make the 
necessary purchases. Along the way, the rogue escaped with the money orders. The 
Governor-General in Council, on behalf of the post office, sought to recover the claim 
on the ground that it was paid under a mistake by relying on s 72 of the ICA 1872. The 
court rejected the claim and explained:155 	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If the reason for the rule that a person paying money under mistake is entitled to 
recover it is that it is against conscience for the receiver to retain it, then when the 
receiver has no longer the money with him or cannot be considered as still having 
it as in a case when he has spent it on his own purposes ... different considerations 
must necessarily arise. 
 
However, in Sales Tax Officer, the seven-member bench of the Supreme Court of 
India disagreed: 'No such equitable considerations can be imported when the terms of 
Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act are clear and unambiguous'.156 This appeared to 
be self-contradictory since the court also agreed with the Privy Council in Prasad 
Singh that estoppel is an available defence to the statutory claim.157 The matter was 
revisited by the Supreme Court in Mafatlal Industries v Union of India, where the 
nine-member bench held that its previous holding in Sales Tax Officer on the issue of 
defences was incorrect, and that change of position is available as a defence to the 
statutory claim. Reddy J, who delivered the main judgment, explained: 'Section 72 of 
the Contract Act is based upon and incorporates a rule of equity. In such a situation, 
equitable considerations cannot be ruled out while applying the said provision'.158 
The Malaysian courts have similarly accepted that certain common law defences 
are available to defeat or exclude the statutory right to recover a mistaken 
enrichment.159 Worthy of special mention is the case of Siti Fatimah where the court 
justified the importation of the change of position defence by drawing a connection 
between s 73 and unjust enrichment.160 It may, of course, be argued that this amounts 
to rewriting s 73, which is not warranted even by the purposive approach required by s 
17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967.161 However, aside from this technical 
concern, there is unlikely to be any serious objection so long as the existence of the 
defences and their governing rules and principles are made clear. Due to the constraint 
of space, this article will consider only two restitutionary defences that frequently arise 
in the context of mistaken enrichment: change of position and bona fide purchase. 
 
(ii) Principles and application 
 
In Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd, Lord Goff refrained from stating the change of 
position defence any less broadly than that '[it] is available to a person whose position 	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has so changed that it would be inequitable in all the circumstances to require him to 
make restitution, or alternatively to make restitution in full'.162 This was to avoid 
inhibiting the development of the defence, leaving its detailed elements to be worked 
out on a case-by-case basis. As Lord Goff also emphasised, 'where recovery is denied, 
it is denied on the basis of legal principle'.163 The change of position defence has since 
undergone significant developments and its elements could be briefly stated.164 First, 
as a general rule, the defendant must have been disenriched; that is, his or her 
enrichment must be reduced or eliminated.165 Although the possibility that a non-
disenriching change of position could give rise to a defence has been left open, there is 
yet to be any case law example and the only available judicial guidance is that it must 
be 'sufficiently significant, precise or substantial'.166 Second, there must be a sufficient 
causal link between the mistaken enrichment and the disenrichment.167 The defendant 
must at least show that the disenrichment would not have occurred but for the receipt 
of the enrichment.168 An example is where a defendant, who receives a mistaken 
payment from the plaintiff, goes on to spend it in a way that he or she would not have 
had he or she known that the money was not his or hers to keep.169 Although 
detrimental reliance usually exists, as in the above example, it is not a requirement. 
The but-for test is equally satisfied where the enrichment is stolen or destroyed 
immediately after its receipt due to natural or third party intervention.170 It is also 
useful to explain the notion of 'extraordinary expenditure', which is sometimes said to 
be required of the defendant.171 This is best understood as turning on the issue of 
causation. As Professor Mitchell explained, 'the question whether a defendant has 
incurred extraordinary expenditure does not turn on the type of transactions he has 
entered, but on the question whether he would have entered them at all, but for his 	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enrichment at the claimant's expense'.172 Third, the change of position could be 
anticipatory; for example, where the defendant incurred expenditure in the expectation 
that he or she will receive the money from the plaintiff, which he or she did in fact 
receive later on.173 Fourth, the defendant must have acted in good faith.174 If the 
defendant knew about the event that would render his or her enrichment unjust, such 
as the plaintiff's mistake, or suspected the same but failed to make any inquiry, he or 
she will be barred from relying on the defence.175 In Dextra Bank,176 the Privy Council 
rejected the concept of relative fault as a determinant of this issue as it would be 
inconsistent with the principle established in Kelly v Solari that a mistaken payer may 
recover 'however careless [he] may have been'.177 This was affirmed by the High Court 
in Siti Fatimah.178 Once triggered, the change of position defence operates to absolve 
the defendant from the duty to make restitution to the extent that he or she has changed 
his or her position, that is, has been disenriched. Correspondingly, to ensure fairness to 
the plaintiff, the defendant must make restitution to the extent that he or she remains 
enriched. 
Convenient to be examined alongside the change of position defence is the 
defence of bona fide purchase for value, the elements of which could be briefly 
explained.179 First, the word 'purchase' is given a wide meaning such that money could 
be the subject matter of a purchase.180 Second, the defendant must have given valuable 
consideration in exchange. The adequacy of the consideration is not investigated but 
its sufficiency is.181 Executory consideration, it seems, is not sufficient.182 Third, the 
defendant must have acted in good faith. This requirement is satisfied if he or she has 
no actual notice of or suspicion about the defect in the fraudster's interest in the 
property.183 The mere fact that there are means of discovering this is irrelevant.184 
Fourth, it is sometimes said that the defence applies only where the defendant is an 
indirect recipient of the property.185 When P makes a mistaken payment to X, who in 	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turn uses the money to buy something from D, D is clearly an indirect recipient and 
purchaser of the money. But what if, instead of paying X, P directly pays D under X's 
instruction? It is argued that there should be no analytical difference between the two 
cases.186 The restriction, it seems, only meant to emphasise that the defence does not 
apply to a contract between P and D.187 Upon the satisfaction of these requirements, 
the defendant obtains a clear title in the property, free from any title-based claim by 
the plaintiff (for example, conversion or proprietary ownership claim). But whether 
the defendant's bona fide purchase for value also protects him or her from an unjust 
enrichment claim for personal restitution has been a matter of dispute. In Foskett v 
McKeown, Lord Millett suggested that it does not.188 However, in the earlier case of 
Price v Neal, the defence was successfully invoked against an action for money had 
and received, a money count.189 
There are two cogent arguments for extending the defence. The first argument is 
based on the need to avoid conflicting positions in the laws of property and unjust 
enrichment. As a creature of property law, the defence is justified by mercantile 
convenience. In the case of money used as currency, for example, the bona fide 
purchaser is given a clear title so as to protect the security of the transaction and to 
facilitate the wider goal of efficient circulation of money.190 Allowing the plaintiff's 
unjust enrichment claim to succeed would undermine this policy choice made by 
property law.191 Thus, in situations where bona fide purchase for value clears titles and 
extinguishes title-based claims (which is a matter of property law), it would also 
protect the defendant against an unjust enrichment claim for personal restitution. The 
defence supported by this argument, however, is a narrow one. This is because even in 	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property law there is no general defence of bona fide purchase for value. The defence 
only operates in limited situations; for example, where the defendant obtains goods 
under a resale, or receives payment in the form of money used as currency, bills of 
exchange or similar negotiable instruments, etc. Beyond these situations, allowing an 
unjust enrichment claim would not result in any conflict with property law. The 
second argument is based on the need to prevent unjust enrichment from subverting 
the contract to which the defendant is a party (with X).192 This argument supports a 
wider defence because it is no longer tied to the situations in which bona fide purchase 
for value operates to clear title and extinguish title-based claims. The choice between 
the two approaches would require further examination of the interactions between 
property, contract and unjust enrichment. It is unnecessary to say anything conclusive 
for now, at least for the purpose of s 73, since the relevant cases all concerned receipt 
of money used as currency. 
The change of position defence and the bona fide purchase defence are clearly 
different creatures, given their separate rationales and effects. While the change of 
position defence operates pro tanto to prevent the defendant from being made worse 
off, bona fide purchase for value operates as a complete defence.193 This practical 
difference is best illustrated by the facts of AmBank.194 There, the moneychanger 
purchased foreign money from elsewhere for RM1.07 million and sold it to the 
fraudster for RM1.075 million. The moneychanger's disenrichment is the cost of 
purchasing the foreign money: RM1.07 million.195 The change of position defence will 
only exempt the moneychanger from repaying this amount. The remaining RM5000, 
which represents the moneychanger's extant enrichment, must be repaid. However, the 
court held that the change of position defence exempted the moneychanger from 
repaying the entire amount. The court's explanation was that the RM5000 represents a 
normal profit margin which the moneychanger would have made in any regular 
currency exchange transaction.196 But this is not a relevant inquiry for the change of 
position defence. Instead, the conclusion is better justified by applying the bona fide 
purchase defence. The moneychanger purchased the money from the fraudster in good 
faith and gave valuable consideration in the form of the foreign money. This gave the 
moneychanger a complete defence to the bank's claim. The bona fide purchase defence 
was applied in two other cases of similar facts, Bumi Cash197 and RHB Bank Bhd,198 to 
absolve the moneychangers from the duty to repay the banks. The defence was also 
implicitly accepted in Royal Bank of Scotland, again of similar facts, only to be 
rejected because the moneychanger failed to adduce sufficient evidence to show that 
the foreign money was paid to the fraudster.199 
An example where the court's failure to properly apply the defences has resulted 
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in an incorrect decision is the case of Affin Bank.200 The facts are again similar. The 
moneychanger, having received the mistaken payment from the plaintiff bank, paid to 
the fraudster foreign money pursuant to a contract. The court clearly accepted that 
there are exceptions to the statutory right to recover a mistaken payment, even citing 
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd as authority for the change of position defence.201 
However, it held in favour of the bank on the ground that the moneychanger had not 
changed its position.202 How the court arrived at this finding is a matter of curiosity, 
especially since the basic elements of the change of position defence were not 
considered. On the facts, the moneychanger would not have paid away the foreign 
money to the fraudster, thereby disenriching itself, but for the receipt of the mistaken 
payment. Since the court also found that the moneychanger has not acted in bad 
faith, 203  the change of position defence should have been available to the 
moneychanger. Moreover, as in the cases cited earlier, the moneychanger should be 




This article has put forward a number of suggestions as to how the courts should 
approach the statutory right to recover a mistaken payment. First, it is important that 
the statutory right is interpreted against its historical background so as to avoid certain 
misconceptions. In section II, we have seen how ignorance of legal history has led the 
courts to draw false analogy between the statutory claim and a contractual claim, and 
illogical distinctions between the statutory claim, an unjust enrichment claim and a 
claim for money had and received. Second, there is a need to develop the content of 
the statutory right so as to enable it to adequately address complex disputes. The most 
efficient method is to draw from the experience of other major common law 
jurisdictions. In section IV, it was demonstrated that the prevailing common law unjust 
enrichment analysis could be usefully incorporated into the statutory framework of s 
73. The central theme that flows through these suggestions is the importance of first 
principles. Clearly, the Malaysian courts have yet to fully grasp the intricacies of the 
law of unjust enrichment, as evidenced by their occasional broad-brush treatment of s 
73 and its recognised exceptions. Given how frequently issues of unjust enrichment 
arise, it is of utmost importance that the courts translate their enthusiasm for the 
subject into approaching it in a principled manner. 	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